Imagine walking down the street when suddenly, pagers start exploding all around you—this chaos erupted across Lebanon, causing massive casualties and raising fears of a new wave of attacks using wireless technology.
What happened?
On Tuesday 17th September, hundreds of pagers used by Hezbollah members exploded all over Lebanon. This happened just one day after Israeli officials mentioned they might increase attacks on the Iranian-backed group. The explosions went off in various places like sidewalks, grocery stores, homes, and cars, killing at least 11 people and injuring 1000s. People saw smoke coming from their pockets before the explosions made people fall.
What is a Pager? How it works?
Let me tell you briefly what that is and why a terrorist organization uses pager in today’s day and age.
A pager is a small device that receives and displays text messages or alerts. Think of it as an old-school version of a cell phone. You will have to carry it with you, and if someone wanted to get your attention, they’d send a message to your pager. It would beep or vibrate, and you’d check the screen to read the message.
Now, you might wonder why, in today’s world of smartphones and instant messaging, someone would still use a pager. Well, there are a few reasons. Pagers are incredibly reliable in places with poor cell reception. They also have a long battery life, which makes them useful in critical situations where you need a device to last for days without charging.
For a terrorist organization, pagers can offer some advantages. They’re less likely to be intercepted or tracked compared to modern communication methods. And they can operate on specific frequencies that might be harder for authorities to monitor. I am not saying impossible, authorities generally do not prioritize monitoring pager frequencies compared to more heavily used and monitored communication channels. So, even though pagers might seem outdated, they still hold value in certain high-security or covert operations. Their simplicity and reliability make them a useful tool for those who need secure and consistent communication.
How did these Pagers blast?
Hezbollah has used pagers for years. At 3:30 p.m. on Sept 16th, 2024, pagers received a message that appeared as though it was coming from Hezbollah’s leadership. The pagers beeped for several seconds before exploding.
It’s not like every communication device we buy, whether it’s a major one like a mobile phone or anything else, already has explosives built into it that can be remotely activated to blow up whoever we want at any time. That’s absolutely not the case.
So, it’s clear that someone must have tampered with these pagers before handing over them to Hezbollah.
It is said that, Israel secretly inserted explosive materials into pagers that were shipped from Taiwan to Lebanon. These explosives, weighing just one or two ounces, were cleverly hidden next to the battery in each pager.
Hezbollah had ordered these pagers from a company named Gold Apollo in Taiwan. Therefore 2 things must have happened, before the pagers reached Lebanon,
1) Someone must have placed explosives in these pagers i.e. the Israeli intelligence agency must have done this.
2) the manufacturer must have done this.
In this case, the manufacturer is a Taiwanese company named Gold Apollo.
The idea was to create a situation where the pagers would explode once they were in use.
Hezbollah has ordered over 3,000 pagers and they have distributed these pagers to their members all across Lebanon, and some even went to its allies in Iran and Syria. In Syria. Even there they exploded.
Even Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon, Mojtaba Amini, was among those affected by the recent pager explosions. According to Iranian state media, his pager detonated, injuring his hand and face. He was promptly taken to a hospital in Beirut for treatment.
Israel has a well-documented history of using technology for covert operations, especially targeting Iran and groups backed by Iran. For instance, in 2020, Israel carried out the assassination of Iran’s top nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, using an advanced AI robot controlled remotely via satellite. This high-tech method highlights Israel’s capability for precise and remote strikes.
The following year i.e. 2021, Israel disrupted Iran’s gasoline distribution nationwide by hacking into the servers of the Iranian oil ministry. This cyberattack caused significant disruptions in fuel supplies across the country. Then, in February of this year 2024, Israel blew up two major gas pipelines in Iran, affecting service in several cities.
Looking back further, in 1996, an exploding cellphone was used to kill a Palestinian bomb maker in Gaza. This attack was widely attributed to Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security service. Another notable incident occurred in July 2024, when a bomb planted in a guesthouse in Tehran killed Ismail Haniyeh, a Hamas political leader, just hours after he attended the inauguration of Iran’s new president.
These examples demonstrate Israel’s strategic use of technology and covert operations to achieve its objectives and impact its adversaries.
How did Israel tamper with these Pagers?
As I mentioned, Hezbollah has ordered these pagers from a company named Gold Apollo in Taiwan. However, the company has denied any involvement, and they have said that the pagers used were made by a Hungarian partner company under their brand name.
Now who is that partner company?
Gold Apollo has a long-term partnership with Budapest-based BAC Consulting KFT to use its trademark. It is a Hungarian company that specializes in the production and sale of pagers.
But a Hungarian government spokesperson said the pagers were never in Hungary and that BAC Consultants merely acted as an intermediary with no manufacturing or operational site in Hungary.
Now the question is how this Hungarian company supplied 3000 pagers to Hezbollah.
There are 3 ways:-
1. Direct Contact: either through formal business channels or through informal connections.
2. Third-Party Intermediaries: Hezbollah could have used third-party intermediaries to place orders in order to hide direct connection.
3. Open Market Sales: It’s possible that Hezbollah purchased the pagers through open market channels like retail stores, online purchases, etc…
Now if you purchase something through open market sales (option 3), you cannot tamper them. At least tempering of 3000 pagers is impossible unless they were all shipped together in a single consignment.
That means we are left with option 1 and 2.
Now, considering options 1 & 2, option 1 seems a bit unlikely. Just think about it: if a Taiwanese company or an intermediary company were to directly contact Hezbollah, which is a terrorist organization, it would be extremely damaging to the company’s reputation and carry significant risks of getting into trouble. On the other hand, consider this: Taiwan and Hungary are allied with Western countries, so why would Hezbollah trust them? That would be like inviting disaster for themselves.
Option 2 is more likely to have happened. Taiwan’s European intermediary company was contacted by another company on behalf of Hezbollah. In other words, it’s all about the game of intermediary companies.
Now, we don’t know who that intermediary company is who bought these pagers on behalf of Hezbollah. But it’s clear that the wholesaler or distributor involved must be an asset of the Israeli Intelligence Agency. This would explain how such a large number of pagers could be tampered with effectively.
Tags:- #Hezbollah #Israel #Mossad #Lebanon #PagerExplosions #TechWarfare #CovertOps #MiddleEast